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Effects of Environmental and Land Use Regulation in the Oil
and Gas Industry Using the Wyoming Checkerboard
as an Experimental Design
By MITCH KUNCE, SHELBY GERKING, AND WILLIAM MORGAN*
This paper estimates the extra costs of drill-
ing for oil and gas on federal land as compared
to private land in the Wyoming Checkerboard.
The Checkerboard, an important site of recent
oil and gas activity, is a 40-mile-wide strip of
land, 20 miles on each side of the Union Pacific
Railroad right-of-way, extending westward ap-
proximately 200 miles from Rawlins in south
central Wyoming to the Utah state line. The
Pacific Railway Acts of 1862 and 1864 con-
veyed to the railroad both surface and mineral
rights to the odd-numbered (square-mile) sec-
tions of land in this area, while retaining the
even-numbered sections as federal property.1
Thus, four private (railroad) sections sur-
rounded each federal section and four federal
sections surrounded each private section, giving
land ownership maps of this area the appearance
of a checkerboard.2 Since the 1860’s, some of
the land has changed hands; however, the alter-
nating ownership pattern is remarkably persis-
tent to the present day and serves as an
experimental control that may be used to iden-
tify differences in drilling cost on federal and
private property. Estimates presented suggest
that average drilling costs per well are about
$200,000 higher on federal property than on
private property. This difference is attributed to
more stringent enforcement of environmental
and land use regulations on federal land.
I. Checkerboard Drilling Costs
Environmental aspects of oil and gas field
work in the United States are subject to numer-
ous federal statutes such as the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act, the Toxic Substances
Control Act, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
the Antiquities Act, and the Threatened and
Endangered Species Act. These statutes apply
to industry activities on all types of land, al-
though an engineering study (B. Harder et al.,
1995), a survey of operators, landowners, and
federal land managers (Kunce et al., 2001), and
congressional testimony (James T. Hackett,
2001) suggest that enforcement is more strin-
gent on federal land than on private land. In
particular, cultural resources (i.e., Native Amer-
ican artifacts and historical sites) and biological
resources (i.e., wildlife habitat) appear to be
given greater protection on federal property as
compared with private property.
This paper focuses on costs arising from en-
vironmental and land use regulations pertaining
to drilling. Drilling, rather than production, is
analyzed for three reasons. First, although en-
vironmental contamination can occur at any
stage in the life cycle of oil and gas wells,
drilling is thought to be the activity of greatest
risk because of the large volumes of potentially
hazardous gases and fluids brought to the sur-
* Kunce and Morgan: Department of Economics and
Finance, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82071;
Gerking: Department of Economics, University of Central
Florida, Orlando, FL 32816. This research is partially sup-
ported by an appropriation from the Wyoming Legislature
(1999 Wyoming Session Laws, Chapter 168, Section 3).
Results presented may or may not reflect the views of public
officials in that state. Gerking acknowledges the hospitality
of CentER, Tilburg University, where portions of this paper
were completed, as well as support from visiting Grant
B46-386 from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific
Research (NWO). The University of Wyoming Spatial Data
Visualization Center also provided research support. Robert
W. Noffsinger provided excellent research assistance. Mi-
chael Greenstone, Junsoo Lee, John Livernois, Laura Mar-
siliani, and an anonymous referee contributed numerous
helpful suggestions as did seminar participants at the Uni-
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1 For a colorful account of this land transaction and other
inducements granted by the federal government to support
construction of the transcontinental railroad through Wyo-
ming, see Taft A. Larson (1965).
2 Detailed maps showing the current ownership pattern
of land around the Union Pacific railway line in southwest-
ern Wyoming are available from the Wyoming Spatial Data
and Visualization Center (http://www.wims.uwyo.edu).
1588
face (E. G. Carls et al., 1994). Second, data on
drilling costs, collected by the American Petro-
leum Institute (various years), are much richer
than the highly aggregated data on production
costs reported by the U.S. Department of En-
ergy, Energy Information Administration (vari-
ous years). Third, drilling is a one-time activity,
whereas production from a given well may last
for many years. Production cost conditions can
change over time as subsurface pressure de-
clines causing wells to lose their natural drive.
Thus, it would be easier to analyze drilling costs
than production costs even if the quality of data
on both activities were the same.
Are drilling costs higher on federal property
than on private property in the Wyoming
Checkerboard? The American Petroleum Insti-
tute (various years) collects drilling cost data
from operators on completed wells drilled in the
United States, including dry holes. Types of
costs reported include variable cost items such
as labor, materials, supplies, machinery and
tools, water, transportation, fuel, and power.
Also, information about costs of direct overhead
such as for permitting and site preparation, road
building, drilling pit construction, erecting and
dismantling derricks/drilling rigs, hauling and
disposal of waste materials, and site restoration
is obtained. The survey, however, does not re-
quest information about lease acquisition costs.
Thus, while the survey data include major ele-
ments of drilling cost associated with environ-
mental and land use regulation, they do not
reflect the way in which such regulations may
have been capitalized in the value of a lease.
Also, I.H.S. Energy Group, Inc. compiles data
on additional characteristics of completed wells
and merges this information with the drilling
cost data. Supplementary characteristics mea-
sured include depth (in feet), surface land own-
ership (private, federal, state, or tribal), well
type (oil, gas, or dry), and well location in
latitude and longitude coordinates.3 Data avail-
able from I.H.S. contain information on about
325,000 completed onshore wells drilled be-
tween 1987–1999.4
While the complete data set has a large num-
ber of observations with details about each well
drilled, a disadvantage is that components of
total cost are not itemized. This means that the
environmental compliance component of drilling
cost cannot be directly identified and standard
methods cannot be used to estimate a drill-
ing cost function. An estimate of the desired
cost differential, however, can be obtained by
limiting attention to a comparison of drilling
costs on federal and private land in the Wyo-
ming Checkerboard. The land ownership pat-
tern there provides an experimental control for
five factors that would otherwise contaminate
the resulting estimates: (1) remoteness, (2) char-
acteristics of reserves, (3) environmental re-
sources, (4) regional differences in attitudes
toward resource development, and (5) manage-
ment. In general, federal land tends to be lo-
cated at greater distances from cities and towns
than rural private land and many tracts of fed-
eral land have been set aside for specific pur-
poses (e.g., parks, forests, recreational areas)
that rule out use for permanent settlements.
Thus, drilling costs may be higher on federal
land because it is less accessible. Also, it may
happen that characteristics of hydrocarbon re-
serves on federal land differ from those on
private land. For example, reserves could be
deeper on federal land than on private land, or
private land could be relatively richer in oil
reserves than gas reserves. Moreover, there may
be differences in the quantity of environmental
resources to protect on federal versus private
land. Differences between scenic attributes of
national park and national forest lands and rural
private land may be most obvious, but less
immediately noticeable ecological differences
may be important as well. In fact, some federal
lands have been set aside to protect specific,
unique or diverse environmental resources. Re-
garding management, the U.S. Department of
Interior [National Park Service and Bureau of
Land Management (BLM)] manages some fed-
eral lands, while the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture (National Forest Service) manages
others so it is useful to control for possible
policy differences between agencies. Finally,
regional differences in attitudes toward resource
development may affect decision-making on
both federal and private lands. J. Vernon Hen-
derson (1996) discusses the possible importance
of this aspect in a manufacturing context.
3 Longitude and latitude coordinates provided are accu-
rate to five decimal places and place each well to within one
meter of its exact location.
4 Data for earlier years also are available, but measures
of cost are less accurate and location of wells are missing or
at least appear to be less precise than for 1987–1999.
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In the Checkerboard, the pattern of current
land ownership is almost entirely determined by
the land grant provided by the Pacific Railway
Acts of 1862 and 1864. These acts predate
broad-scale environmental concern in the
United States by as much as a century and
predate even the first U.S. national park (Yel-
lowstone), which was established in 1872.
Since that time, certain sections have changed
hands; for example, federal sections have been
sold or traded for private sections to accommo-
date expansion of towns, to permit better access
to water for agriculture, as well as for other
purposes. In a few cases, the state of Wyoming
traded land owned in other locations for federal
sections in the Checkerboard. Also, the Union
Pacific Railroad has sold all of the sections it
originally owned to other private owners,
mainly for use in agriculture. These land trans-
actions, however, have not greatly disturbed the
original alternating federal–private ownership
pattern established by the Pacific Railway Acts.
Figure 1 shows a portion of the Checkerboard
near the town of Wamsutter, Wyoming. BLM
land is shown in light gray, private land is
shown in dark gray, and state land is shown in
dotted squares. Locations of wells drilled be-
tween 1987–1999 are shown using white trian-
gles. Figure 1 also identifies two areas where
federal and private ownership of land has been
consolidated. These consolidations, which are
two of the largest in the entire Checkerboard,
are excluded from the analysis below. Also,
climate and topography of the Checkerboard are
relatively homogeneous (high altitude desert).
This feature, together with the prevailing land
ownership pattern, means that remoteness, re-
serve characteristics, and the quantity of surface
environmental resources on each type of land in
the Checkerboard should be roughly equal.
Moreover, BLM is responsible for all federal
land there and the area is small enough that
public attitudes toward development are un-
likely to vary between locations.
If the Checkerboard is a valid experimental
control, then only characteristics of wells that
are related to environmental and land use regu-
lations should differ between federal land and
private land. To test this, data were obtained for
1,463 wells drilled in the Checkerboard over the
FIGURE 1. CHECKERBOARD MAP
Note: Light gray—BLM land; dark gray—private land; dotted squares—state land.
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period 1987–1999. The 59 wells drilled on state
land were excluded from the analysis because of
their relatively small number and because the
state did not acquire sections at random. Of the
remaining 1,404 wells, 44 percent were drilled
on federal land, and 56 percent were drilled on
private land. Using a t-test, the null hypothesis
of equality of these proportions is rejected at the
1-percent level (David J. Sheskin, 1997). A
higher proportion of drilling on private land
would be expected if drilling costs on federal
property are higher, or if delays in obtaining
needed permits are longer.
Table 1 presents tests for differences between
means for all other available variables. As
shown, mean well depth on federal land is
10,706 feet while mean well depth on private
land is 10,433 feet, a difference of 273 feet, or
about 2.6 percent.5 The null hypothesis of no
difference between mean well depth on the two
types of property is not rejected at the 5-percent
level using a t-test assuming independent sam-
ples with equal variances. This version of the
test was applied because the null hypothesis of
equal variances was not rejected at the 1-percent
level using an F-test. Similar distributions of
well depth on federal and private property
would be expected if the checkerboard land
ownership pattern controls for reserve depth.
Table 1 also shows that roughly the same
fractions of oil and gas wells are drilled on
federal and private land, testing at the 5-percent
level for equality of proportions using a t-test.
This outcome suggests that reserve characteris-
tics other than depth are similar on the two types
of land. Also, the smaller percentage of dry
holes on federal property (0.091) versus private
property (0.116) might suggest that greater pre-
cautions are taken there to avoid such an out-
come, but the difference in these two
proportions is not significantly different from
zero at the 5-percent level.6 Finally, the propor-
tion of wells drilled on federal and private land
in two of the three BLM districts is about the
same. In the Rawlins BLM district, however,
the percentage of wells drilled on private land is
disproportionately greater than the percentage
of wells drilled on federal land. An increase in
drilling on private land in this area in 1999
appears to be responsible for this outcome.7
Table 2 shows that mean real drilling costs
are higher on federal land than on private land.8
Real drilling costs are computed from nominal
drilling costs using the 1995 U.S. GDP deflator
for the years 1987–1999. The top portion of
Table 2 shows that for all wells, average real
drilling costs on federal land are higher by
$201,000 than on private land. This difference
5 Wells drilled in the Checkerboard are relatively deeper
than those drilled elsewhere. In Wyoming average well
depth over the 1987–1999 period was 6,586 feet, and the
average depth of onshore U.S. wells during this time was
4,904 feet.
6 The relatively low percentage of dry wells (12 percent)
suggests that development wells may outnumber explor-
atory wells and perhaps reflects application of recent tech-
nological advances such as three-dimensional seismic
reservoir identification methods.
7 If the 1999 data are disregarded, then the null hypoth-
esis of equality between the percentage of federal land wells
drilled in the Rawlins district and the corresponding per-
centage of private land wells drilled in that district would
not be rejected at 5 percent using a two-tail test. The recent
increase in drilling on private land in this area may reflect
higher costs of drilling on federal property.
8 A regression estimated using all 1,463 observations of
real drilling cost on dummy variables for land ownership
indicates that the null hypothesis of no difference in drilling
cost between private land and state land would not be
rejected at conventional significance levels. Thus, the com-
parison of drilling costs on federal vs. private land would
appear to be of greatest interest.
TABLE 1—DIFFERENCE IN MEANS FOR DEPTH, WELL TYPE,
AND BLM DISTRICT
Variable Private Federal
Test statistic
(private–federal)
Depth Mean 10,433 10,706 1.79
(in feet) s.e. 102.25 112.58
Oil wells Mean 0.066 0.054 0.93
(fraction of total) s.e. 0.0088 0.0090
Gas wells Mean 0.818 0.855 1.78
(fraction of total) s.e. 0.0142 0.0141
Dry wells Mean 0.116 0.091 1.44
(fraction of total) s.e. 0.0120 0.0110
Rawlins district Mean 0.486 0.422 2.39
(fraction of total) s.e. 0.0178 0.0199
Rock Springs district Mean 0.277 0.318 1.67
(fraction of total) s.e. 0.0159 0.0188
Kemmerer district Mean 0.237 0.260 0.99
(fraction of total) s.e. 0.0152 0.0177
Observations 789 615
Note: s.e. denotes standard error.
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is significant at less than the 1-percent level
using a t-test for equality of means assuming
independent samples with unequal variances.
An F-test of the null hypothesis of equal vari-
ances also is rejected at the 1-percent level in
this case. In light of effects controlled by re-
stricting attention to the Wyoming Checker-
board, the drilling cost premium identified on
federal land is cautiously interpreted as the re-
sult of increased stringency of application of
environmental and land use regulations. Evalu-
ated at mean real drilling costs for the Check-
erboard between 1987–1999 ($965,000/well),
this premium represents a cost increase of about
21.7 percent.
The lower portion of Table 2 shows that the
cost premium for drilling on federal land is
significantly different from zero for each of
three ranges of well depth (using t-tests at less
than the 5-percent level) and, more importantly,
that it increases with the depth of wells.9 For
relatively shallow wells (those at a depth of
9,600 feet or less), the average real drilling cost
on federal land is about $53,000 higher than on
private land. For wells drilled to depths of be-
tween 9,600 and 12,300 feet, the cost difference
is $96,000, and for the deepest wells, the cost
difference is $268,000.10 The null hypothesis
that the private/federal cost differences for the
deepest and shallowest wells are the same can
be rejected at 1 percent using a t-test assuming
independent samples and using the pooled vari-
ance from the entire sample to approximate the
subsample variances. A possible explanation for
why the cost premium increases with well depth
is that deeper wells require more time to drill
and on federal property, drilling is more likely
to be interrupted by the more stringent applica-
tion of environmental and land use regulations
prevailing there. These regulations impose sea-
sonal bans on drilling aimed at protecting ar-
cheological sites, big game winter range, and
habitat for several species of birds and raptors.
Thus, particularly on federal property, deep
wells must be drilled incrementally in possibly
inefficient phases that can stretch over a year or
more (Hackett, 2001, p. 7).
These estimates, however, are subject to at
least three qualifications. First, when a number
of wells are drilled in a particular lease area,
operators may have difficulty in allocating fixed
costs (including those associated with environ-
mental compliance) between wells. This prob-
lem arises on both federal and private property,
but is a factor that would reduce the precision of
the estimates presented. Second, the estimates
presented are averages of cost premiums for
drilling on federal property, rather than an extra
cost applicable to all drilling sites on this type of
land. For example, quantities of environmental
resources to protect in the Checkerboard vary
greatly over space, so the cost premium may
well be higher on some federal sections than on
others. Third, estimates of the drilling cost pre-
9 Further analysis reveals no consistent time trend to
report in the cost premium for drilling on federal land.
10 Data reported in Table 2 show that the proportion of
deep wells drilled on federal property (0.48) is significantly
greater (at the 1-percent level) than the corresponding pro-
portion of shallow wells (0.39), whereas the opposite out-
come might be expected. Operators, however, are
constrained by the depth of reserves when choosing the
depth of wells. Also, if the expected payoff from relatively
deep wells is higher than the expected payoff from rela-
tively shallow wells, then the extra environmental compli-
ance costs on federal property may be less of a deterrent to
drilling as depth increases. In this regard, 70 percent of the
dry holes in the sample were drilled to depths less than
9,600 feet, while 18 percent of dry holes were drilled deeper
than 12,300 feet, so it appears that more information is
accumulated about well prospects as expected depth
increases.
TABLE 2—DIFFERENCE IN MEANS
FOR REAL DRILLING COST
Variable Private Federal
Test statistic
(private–federal)
Real drilling cost Mean 885 1,086 4.03
(in thousands of $1995) s.e. 25.28 43.06
Observations 789 615
Real drilling cost Mean 500 553 2.63
(well depth  9,600 feet) s.e. 12.43 15.84
Observations 280 181
Real drilling cost Mean 783 879 4.92
(well depth  9,600 feet
and  12,300 feet) s.e. 11.43 15.82
Observations 259 204
Real drilling cost Mean 1,421 1,689 2.23
(well depth  12,300 feet) s.e. 64.70 101.08
Observations 250 230
Note: s.e. denotes standard error.
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mium on federal property may be to some ex-
tent offset by capitalization of the extra costs
into lease values.
II. Implications and Conclusions
These estimates have several implications for
both public policy and future research. One
policy issue is whether drilling regulations
should be more stringently enforced on federal
land than on other types of land. If the purpose
of the regulations is to internalize negative ex-
ternalities associated with drilling, then enforce-
ment of regulations should be similar on similar
types of land.
A second issue relates to possible reductions
in output of oil and gas due to more stringent
enforcement of regulations on federal property.
Reduced output from currently producing re-
serves may add to incentives to explore in the
most environmentally sensitive areas (i.e., na-
tional parks and the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge) sooner than otherwise. Also, the value
of reduced future output represents a lower-
bound estimate of the opportunity cost of regu-
lation of surface land use. An estimate of this
cost for Wyoming, obtained by valuing esti-
mates of lost future output each year using
estimates of the discounted shadow price of the
resource in the ground, comes to about $1 bil-
lion (Kunce et al., 2001). This figure, of course,
must be balanced against benefits of increased
protection of biological, cultural, and other en-
vironmental resources on land where oil and gas
exploration and development may occur. Yet,
monetary estimates of these benefits are not
well established and further research may be
warranted to determine whether the current reg-
ulatory structure should be made more or less
stringent. Checkerboard land in Wyoming and
other states may be a useful setting for such
studies.
A third issue is concerned with effects on
production tax revenue in states that apply these
types of taxes. Federal policies that restrict out-
put force such states to cut back on public
service expenditures or fund public services
from other revenue sources. Thus, it is easy to
see why public officials in states such as Wyo-
ming, New Mexico, and Alaska with large
amounts of federal property that rely heavily on
mineral production tax revenue to finance pub-
lic services can be vocal opponents of more
stringent environmental and land use regulation.
REFERENCES
American Petroleum Institute. Joint association
survey on drilling costs. Washington, DC:
American Petroleum Institute, various years.
Carls, E. G.; Fenn, D. F. and Chaffey, S. “Soil
Contamination by Oil and Gas Drilling
and Production Operations in Padre Island,
Texas.” Journal of Environmental Manage-
ment, 1994, 40, pp. 273–86.
Hackett, James T. “Testimony on Behalf of the
Domestic Petroleum Council before the
House Resources Subcommittee on Energy
and Mineral Resources.” Washington, DC,
March 15, 2001.
Harder, B.; John, C. and Dupont, A. “Impacts of
Environmental Regulations on Future Re-
source Development in Louisiana Wetlands.”
Society of Petroleum Engineers, Paper No.
009707, March 1995, pp. 167–79.
Henderson, J. Vernon. “Effects of Air Quality
Regulation.” American Economic Review,
September 1996, 86(4), pp. 789–813.
Kunce, Mitch; Gerking, Shelby and Morgan,
William. “Environmental and Land Use Reg-
ulation in the Wyoming Checkerboard.”
Unpublished manuscript, University of Wyom-
ing, 2001 (available at http://w3.uwyo.edu/
mkunce/Checker.pdf).
Larson, Taft A. History of Wyoming. Lincoln,
NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1965.
Sheskin, David J. Handbook of parametric and
nonparametric statistical procedures. New
York: CRC Press, 1997.
U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration. Cost and indexes for domes-
tic oilfield equipment and production opera-
tions, DOE/EIA-0185. Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, various years.
1593VOL. 92 NO. 5 KUNCE ET AL.: EFFECTS OF REGULATION IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
This article has been cited by:
1. Eric Lewis. 2019. Patchwork Policies, Spillovers, and the Search for Oil and Gas. American Economic
Journal: Economic Policy 11:1, 380-405. [Abstract] [View PDF article] [PDF with links]
2. Garret Christensen, Edward Miguel. 2018. Transparency, Reproducibility, and the Credibility of
Economics Research. Journal of Economic Literature 56:3, 920-980. [Abstract] [View PDF article]
[PDF with links]
3. Adam Cox, Russell Craig, Dennis Tourish. 2018. Retraction statements and research malpractice in
economics. Research Policy 47:5, 924-935. [Crossref]
4. S. Serban Scrieciu. 2015. Measuring Environmental Action and Economic Performance in Developing
Countries. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
5. HANAN G. JACOBY, GHAZALA MANSURI. 2008. Land Tenancy and Non-Contractible
Investment in Rural Pakistan. Review of Economic Studies 75:3, 763-788. [Crossref]
6. Denise Hare. 2008. The Origins and Influence of Land Property Rights in Vietnam. Development
Policy Review 26:3, 339-363. [Crossref]
7. Shelby Gerking, William E Morgan. 2007. Effects of Environmental and Land Use Regulation in
the Oil and Gas Industry Using the Wyoming Checkerboard as a Natural Experiment: Retraction.
American Economic Review 97:3, 1032-1032. [Crossref]
8. Harounan Kazianga, William A. Masters. 2006. Property rights, production technology, and
deforestation: cocoa in Cameroon. Agricultural Economics 35:1, 19-26. [Crossref]
9. Shelby Gerking, Glenn W. Harrison. 2006. Risk Perception, Valuation and Policy: Introduction.
Environmental & Resource Economics 33:3, 267-271. [Crossref]
10. Glenn W. Harrison, John A. List. 2004. Field Experiments. Journal of Economic Literature 42:4,
1009-1055. [Abstract] [View PDF article] [PDF with links]
11. Glenn W. Harrison. FIELD EXPERIMENTS AND CONTROL 17-50. [Crossref]
